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PLIGHT OF THE NON-DEBTOR TENANT:
A RELEVANT INTEREST IN A BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDING
BENJAMIN J. CASPER*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are the owner of a popular sporting goods shop in the local
mall. Your business is booming, thanks in part to the foresight you had to
ensure your store lease provided you with the exclusive right to sell
sporting goods in the mall. Not so lucky was a neighboring tenant, whose
toy store fell on hard times, forcing him to declare bankruptcy. A few
months later you are dismayed to find out that your neighbor's bad fortune
is also bad luck for you because suddenly the toy store has been replaced
by another sporting goods store. Regardless of whether your landlord had
objections to this new tenant, a court determined that releasing the toy store
of its lease in this manner was a necessary step in attempting to help the
owner out of bankruptcy. In doing so, the court completely disregarded the
effects that the presence of this new competitor might have on your
business. A glaring issue thus surfaces: Should you be punished for
someone else's shortcomings, without being given a chance to voice your
objections? This is the type of situation that can face a shopping center
tenant when a fellow tenant's attempt at reorganization ultimately
disadvantages the solvent tenant's operation of its business. In such a
circumstance, the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly urge courts to
consider the interests of third parties that might be adversely affected.
In general, the Code grants a significant amount of power to a party that
has been forced to file for bankruptcy.' Section 365(a) of the Code gives
the trustee (or debtor in possession) power to assume, reject or assign
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., English Literature, magna cum
laude, 2005, Yeshiva University. The author would like to thank Professor Linda E. Coco for her
assistance and guidance in preparing this Note.
I Section 365 of the Bankruptcy code states that except as provided by certain other sections of the
Code, "the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor." 11 U.S.C.S § 365(a) (2009).
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executory contracts. 2 In the context of bankruptcy law, an executory
contract is understood to mean contracts under which neither party has
materially performed. 3 The debtor's ability to shed itself of a burdensome
executory contract or replace the contract with a more profitable
arrangement can be a useful tool in reorganizing. 4 This power to assign an
executory contract, however, can be complicated in a situation where
assignment of the contract affects third parties. If a debtor tenant, while
attempting to reorganize after filing for bankruptcy, is permitted to assign
its lease to another tenant, the result could amount to a violation of a non-
debtor tenant's exclusivity provision, a disruption of the tenant makeup of
the shopping center, and an economic encumbrance on the non-debtor
tenant's business due to the presence of a new competitor.
This note will focus on the issues involved in the rejection of an
exclusive use clause and the standards by which a rejection should be
evaluated by a court. It will argue that non-debtor tenants should have
legal standing to object to debtor-tenant's lease assignments. Finally, this
note will argue that the legislative history of section 365 and bankruptcy
issues arising in other arenas similar to shopping centers lend strong
support to the contention that bankruptcy courts should consider the
interests of third party, non-debtor tenants in deciding both whether to
approve a given lease assignment and whether a debtor or assignee can
violate a restrictive use clause in a shopping center lease.
Part I provides background on the rights granted to a debtor after filing
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Part II discusses three key cases on the
subject of a debtor-tenant assigning leases in a bankruptcy proceeding, the
manner in which courts have dealt with tenants that seek to reject
restrictive use provisions, and the trends courts are following in giving
landlords an increasing amount of power in bankruptcy proceedings. Part
III argues that there is ample evidence both in the Code and in case law that
suggests that interests of a non-debtor tenant were intended to be protected
2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03 (Allan N. Resnik & Henry J. Sommer eds., Matthew Bender
& Company, Inc., 15th ed. rev. 2009). "Section 365(a) sets forth the basic power of the trustee to
assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases." Id.
3 Id 1 365.02[l]. "Once contracts fully performed on one side or the other are eliminated, only
contracts materially unperformed on both sides remain. These are the contracts that are generally
considered to be executory contracts in bankruptcy " Id.; See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004). "A contract that remains wholly unperformed or for which there remains something still to be
done on both sides, often as a component of a larger transaction and sometimes memorialized by an
informal letter agreement, by a memorandum, or by oral agreement."
4 See id. 365.03[21 (discussing scenarios in which courts have allowed a debtor to reject an
executory contract); See also In re Waldron, 65 B.R. 169, 171 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) ("[T]he
assumption or rejection of executory contracts . . . is a valuable weapon of the Trustee meant to free the
estate to pay larger dividends to the general creditors.").
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from the effects of a fellow tenant's bankruptcy, and that the Code should
explicitly codify this position.
I. BACKGROUND: BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 365 AND EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS
This part discusses the basic background for understanding executory
contracts and the options that the Code provides to the debtor party in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Part L.A describes the generally-held
understanding of an executory contract, and Part I.B explores the standards
that courts use in considering a debtor's assumption or rejection of an
executory contract.
A. What is an executory contract?
One of the most significant powers granted to a debtor that has filed for
bankruptcy is the debtor's right to decide the fate of executory contracts,
that is: contracts that remain unperformed. 5 As important as this power is,
the Bankruptcy Code does not provide a definition of an executory
contract.6 The majority of Federal Courts7 have adopted a definition set
forth by the famous commentator and scholar, Professor Vern Countryman,
and define an executory contract as an agreement where "the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party are so far unperformed that the failure
of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach
excusing performance of the other." 8 These courts hold that if one party has
materially performed its side of the bargain, then the contract can no longer
5 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) ("Thus, the authority to reject an
executory contract is vital to the basic purpose of a Chapter 11 reorganization, because rejection can
release the debtor's estate from burdensome obligations that can impede a successful reorganization.");
cf Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 83 F.3d 735, 742 (1996) ("'Rather, the
executed portions of the contract remain intact, and property rights acquired under the contract prior to
filing became property of the estate despite the trustee's rejection of unperformed obligations of the
contract."') (citing In re Tomer, 128 Bankr. 746, 756 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 147 Bankr. 461
(S.D. Ill. 1992)).
6 NLRB, 465 U.S. at 523 n.6 ("The Bankruptcy Code furmishes no express definition of an
executory contract."); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, 1 365.02[1] ("However, the section
does not define the term 'executory contract."').
7 DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, Executory Contracts: Structuring, Drafting, Planning, and Execution in,
and in Anticipation of Financial Restructuring and Bankruptcy, in UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL
ISSUES BEHIND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY: LEADING LAWYERS ON STRATEGIES FOR
THE STRUCTURING, DRAFTING, AND EXECUTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS, 6 (Aspartore, Inc., 2006).
See also, Oil and Gas Leases and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Uniform Approach, 63 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 337, 341-42 (1989) ("The definition applies by a substantial majority of courts
that have considered executory contract issues is that put forward by Professor Countryman.") Id.
8 Vein Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1974).
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be considered executory and the debtor would no longer have the right to
assume or reject an outstanding contract. 9 In the event that a contract is
considered executory, section 365(a) authorizes the trustee to assume or
reject the executory or unexpired lease, subject to court approval.10
B. Standards for determining a trustee's decision to assume or reject
In most bankruptcy cases, courts use a "business judgment" test in
evaluating a debtor's decision to assume or assign an executory contract.11
The business-judgment rule provides that "[a]s long as assumption [or
rejection] of a lease appears to enhance a debtor's estate, court approval of
a debtor-in-possession's [(DIP)] decision to assume the lease should only
be withheld if the debtor's judgment is clearly erroneous, too speculative,
or contrary to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ... . " 12 The court
must determine if the debtor's estate would be benefited or burdened by the
assumption of the executory contract. 13 This test focuses only on the
interests of the bankrupt estate, essentially ignoring the interests of the non-
debtor party to the executory contract and ignoring any third-party interests
in the contract. 14 The "business judgment" therefore embodies Professor
Countryman's view that the right to reject should be used when it will
benefit the bankrupt estate. 15
9 See Flanigan, supra note 7, at 6.
10 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2009).
11 Orion Pictures Corp., v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that
"a bankruptcy court ... should examine a contract and the surrounding circumstances and apply its best
'business judgment' to determine if it would be beneficial or burdensome to the estate to assume it.");
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, 1 365.03[2] (asserting that, while a court should use its best
judgment, it should "focus on the business judgment of the trustee or debtor in possession, not on its
own business judgment.").
12 See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Allied Tech. Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, 25 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)).
13 See Orion Pictures, 4 F.3d at 1099 (noting that a court must determine "whether assuming the
contract would be a good business decision or a bad one."); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 2, 1 365.03[2] (indicating that courts use their "best business judgment" to see whether an
assumption is beneficial).
14 See William L. Medford & Bruce H. White, Rejecting Executory Contracts: Is the Standard
Changing?, 23-8 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2004). "Thus, more often than not, there is little a non-
debtor party can do in response to a motion to reject other than file or amend its proof of claim." Id. See
generally Douglas W. Bordewieck, The Postpetition, Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an
Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 200 (1985). "It therefore appears that, during the period
from the date of filing until the date on which the DIP rejects or assumes an executory contract, the
non-debtor party is bound to perform. . . ." Id
15 See Countryman, supra note 8, at 450. "Similar to the [trustee's] general power to abandon or
accept other property, this is an option to be exercised when it will benefit the estate."); see also Juliet
M. Moringiello, A Mortgage By Any Other Name: A Plea For The Unform Treatment Of Installment
Land Contracts And Mortgages Under The Bankruptcy Code, 100 DICK. L. REv. 733, 787-88 (1995-
96). "A trustee should only assume a contract when the assumption will benefit the estate." Id.
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For certain types of agreements, some courts have adopted a higher
standard of review of a debtor's decision to assume or reject executory
contracts. 16 A number of executory contracts, such as collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs), may raise issues that affect public interest and are
therefore subject to application of a higher standard of judicial scrutiny.17
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildiscol8 created a "more
rigorous standard" that involved balancing all the relevant equities before
approving or denying the debtor's rejection. Bildisco was a building
supplies distributor that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization on April 14,
1980.19 Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Bildisco had
negotiated a three-year CBA with the union that represented approximately
45% of its employees. 20 In May of 1980, Bildisco, as a DIP, breached the
CBA by refusing to pay wage increases pursuant to the agreement. 21 The
bankruptcy court ultimately approved Bildisco's application to reject the
CBA, and the district court affirmed the rejection order.22 Ultimately, the
issue reached the Supreme Court and, on certiorari, the Court considered
the criteria to be applied by a bankruptcy court in allowing a DIP to reject a
CBA. Writing for a unanimous decision on this issue, Justice Rehnquist
stated that, "[d]etermining what would constitute a successful rehabilitation
involves balancing the interests of the affected parties - the debtor,
creditors, and employees." 23 The Court in Bildisco reiterated what the
Supreme Court and other courts have previously noted in other cases about
the "special nature" 24 of CBAs.25 As one case noted, a CBA is more than
just a contract; it is a generalized code that sets the laws for a particular
industry or company, functioning as a guide to a multitude of cases, each
16 E.g., Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 378 F.3d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that
the "[u]se of the business judgment standard would be inappropriate in this case because it would not
account for the public interest inherent in the transmission and sale of electricity.").
17 See id.; see also Medford & White, supra note 14, at 24 (suggesting that "a stricter standard
should apply to the executory contract rejection analysis when the contract in issue affects the public
interest.").
18 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984). "The standard which we think Congress intended is a higher one than
that of the 'business judgment' rule . . . ." Id.
19 NLRB, 465 U.S. at 517.
20 Id. at 517-18.
21 Id. at 518.
22 Id
23 Id. at 527.
24 Id. at 524.
25 Id. (citing to two Supreme Court cases and a number of Courts of Appeals decisions that
recognized the special nature of a collective bargaining agreement and decided that evaluation of a
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be governed by a stricter standard than the
"business judgment" test).
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with its own unique and unpredictable set of issues. 26 The Bildisco case
serves as an example of a court applying a higher standard than merely
considering whether an agreement benefits or burdens an estate.
Specifically, the Court considered the effect of a debtor's rejection on third
parties.27
Another key case positing a higher standard of review was a Fifth Circuit
decision in Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.28 Mirant Corporation
was one of the largest regulated public utilities that generated, bought, and
sold electricity for use by other utilities, municipalities, and generators
across the country. 29 In July 2003, Mirant filed for Chapter II bankruptcy
and sought to reject a purchasing schedule for electricity that was part of
the larger asset purchase agreement.30 The scheduling contract had been
entered into because Potomac Electric Power Co. ("Potomac"), the seller,
was concerned that it might have difficulty assigning certain power
purchase agreements. 31 Although the contract was initially lucrative,
Mirant later wanted to reject the contract because the rates charged in the
contract had become higher than the market rates. 32 The district court
denied Mirant's motion to reject the scheduling contract. 33 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit noted that this contract for the sale of electricity at wholesale
was unique in nature. 34 Similar to the collective bargaining agreements in
Bildisco, a significant public interest existed for contracts involving the
transmission and sale of electricity.35 On remand, the Fifth Circuit
instructed the district court to "consider applying a more rigorous standard
26 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79
(1960) (describing CBAs and their importance to contractual relationships); see Harry Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004-05 (1955) (discussing the
intricate provisions of a CBA that govern the relationship between employers and employees).
27 Later in this note, the author will suggest that real estate leases and covenants are similar to
CBA's and should be subject to the same type of scrutiny.
28 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004).
29 Mirant, 378 F.3d at 515.
30 Id. at 516 (explaining that Mirant filed a motion to reject the purchasing schedule, which the
parties and the court referred to as the Back-to-Back Agreement).
31 Id at 515 (noting that the parties agreed that any of the purchase power agreements Potomac
could not obtain consent to assign would be governed by the terms of the schedule, and that Mirant
would purchase from Potomac an amount of electricity equal to Potomac's obligation under the
unassigned purchase power agreements and at the same rate specified in those contracts).
32 Id at 515-16 (stating that the high rates specified in the contract caused Mirant significant
financial losses).
33 Id at 516-17 (positing Mirant's motion was denied because the district court did not have
authority to reject the agreement).
34 Id. at 525 (explaining that an interstate contract of this kind is unique).
35 Id. (drawing a comparison to the public interest oriented rationale employed by the Supreme
Court in its ruling on the Bildisco case).
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to the rejection" of the agreement. 36 The Mirant court stated that the
business judgment standard was inappropriate under the circumstances, and
that a stricter standard should be used in analyzing a rejection of an
executory contract when the contract affects public interest. 37 Therefore,
the Bildisco and Mirant holdings suggest that certain petitions for rejection
of executory contracts are subject to elevated standards that consider the
effects rejection would have on third parties.
II. THE BALANCE OF POWER AMONG LANDLORDS AND TENANTS
This part discusses three cases involving debtor-tenants assigning or
rejecting leases after filing for bankruptcy. Part II.A focuses on a fairly
recent case that interpreted section 365 in a way that has given landlords
significantly more power than they had previously granted to oppose a
debtor-tenant's assignment or rejection of a lease. This part also examines
a balancing test used by a number of bankruptcy courts in connection with
a debtor's attempt at disregarding restrictive use clauses in a lease it seeks
to assign. Part II.B critiques a decision that failed to properly consider the
interest of a non-debtor tenant and points out that the courts' improper
reading of the Code could set a dangerous precedent for future cases.
A. Limitations on assignments and restrictions contained in leases are
meant to be followed
When two parties enter into a contract, there is a general expectation that
the terms of the contract will be upheld and followed. Commercial leases
between shopping center landlords and tenants are no different, each
having certain goals in mind when contemplating a lease. This is
especially true due to the carefully planned nature of a shopping center and
the importance for the landlord and tenants to maintain a good tenant
mix. 38 A landlord will generally lease commercial space only to a carefully
selected group of tenants.39 To preserve the desired tenant mix, shopping
36 Id.
37 Id. at 525 (borrowing the language of the standard set forth in Bildisco and applying it to the
scheduling contract in this case); Medford, supra note 14, at 63 (summarizing the Mirant court's view
that the facts of the case necessitated a more rigorous standard than the usual business judgment test in
evaluating Mirant's motion to reject).
38 See infra text accompanying notes 94-97 (discussing the unique characteristics of a shopping
center).
39 See Lisa S. Gretchko, Last in Line: Debtor Beware! Fourth Circuit Enforces Restrictive Use
Clause to Block Debtor/Tenant's Assignment of Shopping Center Lease, 23-7 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18,
18 (2004) (noting that this is important in preserving tenant mix and maintaining control over their
property); see also Alan S. Gover & Ian J. Silverband, Phoenix Coyotes Bankruptcy Can Still Be Model
2011] 305
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center leases typically contain anti-assignment clauses and/or restrictive
use clauses. 40 For many years, tenants filing for bankruptcy were able to
sidestep anti-assignment clauses contained in their leases. 41 This power to
do so was seemingly granted by section 365(f)(1), which contains a general
provision that prohibits the enforcement of "anti-assignment" clauses in
leases.42 This section allows a debtor tenant to assign a lease
"notwithstanding a provision ... that prohibits, restricts or conditions ...
assignment." 43 The effect of this provision has allowed millions of dollars
of value in shopping center leases to be transferred to the tenants' creditors,
despite the objections of numerous shopping center owners.44 The transfer
of these leases can cause extensive damage to the tenant makeup of a
shopping center.45
A recent case in 2004 marked a tremendous victory46 for landlords on
two separate but related grounds. The Fourth Circuit in Trak Auto Corp. v.
West Town Center, LLC47 clarified how to proceed with a lease containing
an anti-assignment clause as it relates to two seemingly contradictory
provisions in the Code.48 In addition, the Trak Auto court provided
guidance in situations involving a debtor's attempt at disregarding a
For Troubled Sports Franchises, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 4, 8 (Fall 2009) (explaining that a proper
tenant mix in a shopping center is desirable because it promotes healthy revenues).
40 Gretchko, supra note 39, at 18; Thomas J. Leanse & Dustin P. Branch, What's the Use?. Court
Protects Retail Landlords' Rights to Control Reassigned Leases, COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT REAL
ESTATE, Sept./Oct. 2004, available at http://www.ciremagazine.com/article.php?article id=101
(discussing the landlord's right to control tenant mixes by use provisions). The author will go into
further detail about the importance of maintaining the agreements in the lease (as mentioned in
365(b)(3)(C)) and maintaining the tenant mix (as mentioned in 365(b)(3)(D)) in a shopping center in
Part III of this Note.
41 See Harris Ominsky, Shopping Centers: Use Clauses Must Be Honored in Tenants'
Bankruptcies, 24 SHOPPING CENTER LEGAL UPDATE 13, 13 (Summer 2004) (citing a recent victory in
the fight for a landlord's right to "enforce lease restrictions on use, alterations, and other operating
issues in shopping center leases."); Stephen A. Bogorad, Retail Bankruptcy: Is it a License for an
Anchor to "Go Dark? ", BANKR. AND CRED. RIGHTS (Holland and Knight, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1,
1999, at 1 4, http://www.hklaw.com/id24660/Publicationldl593/Retumd3l/contentid47442/ (noting
that "shopping center landlords often find themselves on the defensive in retail bankruptcy cases, most
commonly in connection with proposed lease assignments.").
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2009).
43 Id.
44 Ominsky, supra note 41, at 13.
45 See id. "Pursuant to congressional hearings in 1984, Congress concluded that the practice of
avoiding use restrictions in bankruptcy was creating problems with tenant mix sand adversely affecting
shopping centers." Id.; Bogorad, supra note 41, at 13. "Proposed lease assignments pose the greatest
problems when the debtor tenant is an anchor of a shopping center." Id.
46 Leanse & Branch, supra note 40, 1 3. "The Trak Auto decision represents an important victory
for shopping center landlords by emphasizing Section 365(b)(3)(C)'s role in retail bankruptcies." Id.
47 367 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2004) (barring a debtor-tenant from assigning its shopping center lease in
contravention of a provision that limits use of the premises to the sale of auto parts).
48 See Trak Auto Corp., 367 F.3d at 243-44; see also infra text accompanying note 52-61
(detailing the court's analysis of the two contradictory provisions in section 365 of the Code).
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restrictive use clause in a lease.49 Trak Auto was an auto part retailer that
filed for bankruptcy which, in an effort to reorganize its business, sought to
assign a number of its leases of retail space.so One of the retail spaces it
sought to assign was located in a Chicago shopping center called West
Town Center.51 The lease required that the space be used for the sale of
automobile parts and accessories. 52 Trak Auto began soliciting bids for the
lease but was unable to secure an auto parts dealer, and instead sought to
assign the lease to an apparel merchandiser for $80,000.53 Much to the
dismay of the landlord, the bankruptcy court approved the assignment,
concluding that the anti-assignment provision violated 356(f)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code and that West Town did not provide sufficient evidence
that assignment of the lease to the apparel merchandiser would disrupt the
tenant mix of the shopping center. 54 The district court subsequently
affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling and West Town appealed to the
Fourth Circuit. 55
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit overturned the bankruptcy court and held
that West Town's interest in preserving its tenant mix and enforcing the
restrictive use clause in its lease with Trak Auto should be upheld, and that
Trak Auto's motion for assignment should have been denied.56 The court
first wrestled with the issue of what Code provisions govern a lease
assignment in shopping center. 57 The court's analysis is of particular
significance because it helped resolve two ostensibly contradictory
provisions in the Code.58 Section 365(f)(2)(B) allows a debtor to assign an
49 See 367 F.3d at 244-45, and infra text accompanying notes 62-73 (explaining the balancing
used by the court relating to the lease's restrictive use clause).
50 See Trak Auto Corp., 367 F.3d at 240.
51 Id.
52 Id
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 241. After the Fourth Circuit granted a stay, West Town filed a motion to dismiss its own
appeal as moot since the lease it had with Trak Auto had expired. The Fourth Circuit was ruling on this
motion in this decision. Id.
56 Id. at 244-45. The Fourth Circuit held that West Town was free to enforce the remaining
restriction that limits the use of the premises to the retail sale of auto parts and accessories. Id. at 244.
The court reasoned that shopping center leases are in a special category, and shopping center landlords
are provided special protection under § 365(b)(3)(C). Id. at 245. However, the court also explained that
a shopping center lease provision designed to prevent any assignment whatsoever might be a candidate
for invalidation under § 365(f)(1). Id.
57 See id. at 243 (noting the two relevant provisions: § 365(f)(1) and § 365(b)(3)(C)).
58 See id (explaining how § 365(f)(1) is a general provision that permits lease assignment
notwithstanding anti-assignment clauses and § 365(b)(3)(C) is a more specific provision that requires
the assignee of a shopping center lease to honor a clause restricting the use of the premises); see also
Ominsky, supra note 41, at 13 (discussing the conflict in the Code and how the court resolved the
issue).
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unexpired lease if the assignee provides "adequate assurance of future
performance .. . .."59 The Code lists a number of ways to provide adequate
assurance, one of which is assurance that the assignment "is subject to all
the provisions of the lease, including (but not limited to) provisions such as
a radius, location, use or exclusivity provision."60 Furthermore, the
assignment cannot breach any such provision contained in any other lease
or agreement relating to the shopping center.61 The seemingly conflicting
provision is the general provision found in section 365(f)(1), which
prohibits the enforcement of "anti-assignment" clauses in leases. 62
On the one hand, it seems the debtor (and its assignee) must provide
adequate assurance that it will comply with provisions of the lease. On the
other hand, the Code restricts the enforcement of the landlord's clauses
contained in the lease, allowing the debtor to assign the lease
notwithstanding a provision that might restrict assignment, absent receiving
adequate assurance from the debtor's assignee.63 The Trak Auto court
explained that according to canons of statutory construction, section
365(b)(3) trumps the more general legislative provision of section 365(f)(1)
which intended to prohibit anti-assignment clauses. 64  Section
365(b)(3)(C)65 is more specific because it directly relates to shopping
59 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(B) (2009). "The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor only if... adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract
or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a default in such contract or lease."
60 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (2009). Section 365(b)(3) provides:
For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and paragraph (2)(B) of subsection (f),
adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center includes
adequate assurance-
(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such lease, and in the case of an
assignment, that the financial condition and operating performance of the proposed assignee and
its guarantors, if any, shall be similar to the financial condition and operating performance of the
debtor and its guarantors, if any, as of the time the debtor became the lessee under the lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the provisions thereof, including
(but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will not
breach any such provision contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master agreement
relating to such shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any tenant mix or balance in such
shopping center.
Id.
61 Id
62 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2009).
63 See Trak Auto Corp., 367 F.3d at 241 (contrasting two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); see
also In re Fleming Co., 499 F.3d 300, 305 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that "adequate assurances need not be
given for every term of an executory contract.").
6 Trak AutoCorp., 367 F.3d at 243-44 ("When two provisions in a statute are in conflict, 'a
specific [provision] closely applicable to the substance of the controversy at hand controls over a more
generalized provision."') quoting Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2000))).
65 11 U.S.C. §365(b)(3) provides:
2011] PLIGHTOFTHENON-DEBTOR ENANT 309
centers and therefore controlled in the case of Trak Auto's lease.66 Also,
the legislative history weighed in favor of giving the landlord the power to
prevent an unwanted lease assignment, as evidenced by Congress's 1984
amendments to the Code, which put shopping centers in its own category to
make it more difficult for debtor-tenants to assign leases. 67
The court next submitted an approach to determine the fate of a
restrictive use clause in a lease and whether it should survive a debtor's
attempt at assignment. The court balanced the reasonableness of the
debtor's assignment against the harm or effect it would have on the
landlord. 68 In finding that the restrictive use clause in the debtor's lease
should be enforced, the court explained that the landlord's right to choose
its tenant mix and the court's reluctance to challenge that right outweighed
the debtor's interest in violating the clause.69 Furthermore, the restrictive
clause was not so restrictive as to constitute a de facto anti-assignment
clause that would be unenforceable under section 356(f)(1).70 Therefore,
the court said, "[s]ection 365(b)(3)(C) simply does not allow the
For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection . . . adequate assurance of future
performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center includes adequate assurance-
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all the provisions thereof, including
(but not limited to) provisions such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will
not breach any such provision contained in any other lease, financing agreement, or master
agreement relating to such shopping center; ....
Id.
66 See Trak Auto, 367 F.3d at 244 (noting that II U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(C) controls under the court's
use of a canon of statutory construction).
67 See id. at 243 (detailing Congress's 1984 amendments of the shopping center provisions); In re
Rickel Home Centers, Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 299 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining the purpose of the 1984
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
68 See Trak Auto, 367 F.3d at 244 (discussing the landlord's judgment regarding a mix of stores
and the ability of a debtor to assign a lease regardless of market conditions).
69 Id. The Court noted the shopping center landlord's desire for a successful mix of stores. Id.; see
In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 135 B.R. 941, 941-46 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991). Here, the court
denied a debtor's assignment of a retail department store lease to a "specialty" department store geared
toward the more frugal consumer, because the department store was an "anchor store." Accordingly, the
store was a staple of the shopping center and the central component of the shopping center's tenant mix.
Allowing assignment of this lease would disrupt the tenant mix of the shopping center and would make
the shopping center less appealing to the more upscale clientele the landlord hoped to attract. The
Court's balancing test weighed heavily in favor of the landlord's interest in preserving the use provision
requiring a high-end department store as the tenant in that space); see In re J. Peterman Co., 232 B.R.
366, 369-70 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1999). A proposed assignee of a lease was not going to comply with a
use and radius clause that specifically required the premises be operated under the "J. Peterman" brand
name within 60 miles of the shopping center. The court determined that the 60-mile radius was a
"bargained for exchange," and that it was reasonable in the circumstances being that this upscale
discount center was strategically located within short driving distance of New York City. The court did
not find enough of a reason weighing against its enforcement, so it remained a provision of the lease
upon any assignment, and the court denied approval of the assignment to the tenant that refused to
honor the restriction.
70 Trak Auto, 367 F.3d at 244.
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bankruptcy court or [this court] to modify West Town's 'original bargain
with the debtor."' 71
The court's reluctance to classify the restrictive clause as overly
restrictive demonstrates the difficulty a debtor will have to now argue,
using the general provision in section 365(f)(1), that a restrictive use clause
is so restrictive that the clause can be ignored when the debtor attempts to
assign its lease. That being said, while the Trak Auto decision marked a
substantial victory for shopping center landlords, the court clearly stated
the importance of maintaining focus on assisting the bankrupt entity in
recuperating after filing for bankruptcy. 72 Trak Auto did not undermine this
central objective of the Code to help the debtor reorganize; rather, it simply
recognized the importance of other competing factors. The case of In re
Rickel Home Centers Inc.,73 another Fourth Circuit opinion, is often cited
in defense of a debtor's rights to reject executory contracts. It is important
to note that Trak Auto does not overrule that decision. In Rickel, the court
upheld a tenant's ability to reject specific use clauses, ruling that the use
provisions in the leases constituted a de facto anti-assignment clauses and
invalidated those provisions. Rickel, the debtor, was a home-improvement
store operator that sought to assign its many shopping center leases to
Staples, the office-supply store chain.74 Vornado, the owner of one of the
shopping centers where Rickel was located, sought to enforce a provision
in Rickel's lease that limited the tenant use to a "Home Improvement
Center."75
The Rickel court's decision to strike the anti-assignment provisions from
the leases based on section 365(f)(1)76 can be understood in concert with
the Trak Auto ruling that gave deference to the more specific provision of
section 365(b)(3) because the two cases are factually distinguishable. The
major distinction between the facts of Trak Auto and Rickel is that in Rickel
the market for the type of "home improvement center" referred to in the
lease had become "non-existent or in dire straits." 77 As a result, the debtor
tenant was essentially precluded from assigning the lease because the lease
71 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-65, at 67-68 (1983) (emphasis added)).
72 See id. at 244. "Our decision to block Trak Auto's lease assignment is not an attempt on our part
to water down one of the important purposes of Chapter 11. That purpose is to give business debtors
with some prospects the opportunity to reorganize, revive their operations, and continue in existence."
Id.
73 240 B.R. 826 (D. Del 1998).
74 Id. at 828.
75 Id. at 831.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 832.
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forced an assignment to a type of business enterprise that no longer
existed. 78 The Rickel court correctly upheld the Code's concern for the
tenant and protected the tenant from remaining trapped with a lease
restriction that could not be met. In Trak Auto, by contrast, the use
provision that the tenant space be used to sell auto parts was upheld
because, while the court found that assigning to another auto part owner at
that particular time would have been difficult and perhaps uneconomical
since there were a number of other auto part stores in the area, the lease
restriction did not make an assignment impossible.79 It simply meant that
the debtor might encounter problems abiding by the use restriction at that
time. There was no reason, however, to think that the lease could not be
assigned to an auto parts retailer at some point in the not-so-distant future.
Consequently, the restrictive use clause was not classified as overly
restrictive, and did not tip the scales in favor of the debtor's attempt at
invalidating its effectiveness.
Another significant outcome of the distinction between a lease that is
impossible to assign and a lease that is just economically difficult to assign
is found in public policy considerations. 80 Had the Rickel court upheld the
de facto anti-assignment clauses in contention, due to the impossibility of
finding other home improvement centers, the Rickel leases would be
unassignable and inevitably revert back to the landlords. Consequently, the
landlords would have obtained a windfall victory because they could re-let
the properties to alternative tenants at market rates. The Rickel court
wanted to avoid giving the landlords a deal that would exceed their original
bargains. 81 By preventing the landlord from repossessing the tenant space,
the court sought to safeguard the debtors' interests by making the lease
values available to the creditors of the bankrupt tenants' estates. 82 On the
78 See id.
79 See Trak Auto Corp. v. West Town Center, LLC, 367 F.3d 237, 240 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that
there were seven auto parts retailers within three miles of the shopping center).
80 See Harris Ominsky, Shopping Center Lease Assignments in Bankruptcy After In Re Rickel
Home Centers, in THE SUBLEASE AND ASSIGNMENT DESKBOOK 177, 178-79 (Brent C. Shaffer ed.,
American Bar Association 2006) (discussing consequences of a tenant's bankruptcy on the tenant's
landlord);see also Pamela Smith Holleman & Magdalena Ellis, Solvent Shopping Center Tenants:
Reexamination in Light of In Re Trak Auto Corp.: Part 1, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 64 (Dec./Jan.
2005) (comparing the holding of the In Re Trak Auto Corp. case with that of In re Rickel Home
Centers).
81 See Ominsky, supra note 80, at 180 (describing how the Rickel court shifted $35,500,000 in
potential assets from the landlords to general creditors by striking the restrictive use clauses in the
tenant's leases); see also Holleman & Ellis, supra note 80, at 64 (explaining the public policy
considerations behind the Rickel court's elimination of the anti-assignment clauses in Rickels' leases).
82 See Ominsky, supra note 80, at 180 (comparing the impact of the tenant's assignment of the
leases with the possible outcome the landlords could have achieved if the tenant did not declare
bankruptcy); see also Holleman & Ellis, supra note 80, at 64 (contrasting the outcome of the Rickel
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other hand, Trak Auto could have retained its properties for future
assignment until market conditions became more economically viable.
B. The Bankruptcy Court's ill-conceived precedent on standing for non-
debtor tenants: Staples Inc. v. Montgomery Ward, LLC: A non-
debtor's attempt at objection to an assignment is denied.
The Trak Auto court established some of the powers given to a landlord
in a bankruptcy proceeding, but another recent case dealt with a non-debtor
tenant attempting to object to a lease assignment. In Staples Inc. v.
Montgomery Ward LLC,83 the debtor, Montgomery Ward, LLC, sold all or
substantially all of its interests in real property to KRC Acquisition
Corporation.84 After a series of subleases, the property interest was
transferred to Office Depot, Inc.85 Staples, a non-debtor tenant in the
shopping center, tried objecting to a fellow tenant's assignment of its
lease. 86 Staples contended that it would have objected to the proposed sub-
sublease to Office Depot because the proposed sub-sublease conflicts with
Staples' lease provision granting it the exclusive right to operate as an
office supply store in that shopping center.87 In addition, Staples argued
that the lease violated the tenant mix provision in section 365(b)(3)(D)88 of
the Code. 89 The court concluded that Staples did not have standing, and
with almost no discussion of the matter whatsoever, quickly dismissed the
notion that Staples could argue, under section 365 (b)(3)(D), that the lease
assignment would disrupt the shopping center's tenant mix and would
directly compete with the non-debtor's business. 90
holding on the debtor with that on the debtor in In Re Track Auto).
83 307 B.R. 782 (D. Del. 2004) (affirming the district court's denial of a Staples, Inc.'s objection to
assignment of debtor's property interests to competitor Office Depot, Inc.).
84 Staples, Inc., 307 B.R. at 784 (determining that debtor Montgomery Ward, LLC's assignment of
the lease to KRC Acquisition Corp. was valid).
85 Id (concluding that each subsequent transfer of debtor Montgomery Ward, LLC's lease was
valid).
86 Id. (finding Staples, a third party tenant, lacked standing to object to proposed sub-sublease to
Office Depot).
87 Id. (explaining that even if Staples did not lack standing to object to proposed lease, its objection
would fail because the sublease allowed any lawful use of the premises).
88 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(D) provides: "For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection ...
adequate assurance of future performance of a lease of real property in a shopping center includes
adequate assurance- . . . (D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt any tenant
mix or balance in such shopping center."
89 See Staples, Inc., 307 B.R. at 784. "By its appeal, Staples contends that it did not receive notice
of either the designation of Target or any proposed use of the TBA Outparcel. " Id.
90 See id at 786-87. "In the alternative, assuming Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over this
matter and that Staples has standing and is not otherwise barred from seeking relief, the Court would
conclude that the Bankruptcy Court properly denied Staples' Motion." Id.
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The court, however, erred in its reasoning regarding notice and
misapplied sections 365(b)(3)(C) and (D). Section 1109 of the Code
confers "upon part[ies] in interest" the right to "appear and be heard on any
issue in a case under [Chapter 11]."91 The Code does not define who
qualifies under the statute as "party in interest," but rather "the language of
the statue and relevant treatises suggest that the term should be broadly
construed and liberally applied." 92 One such treatise states: "The general
theory behind the section is that anyone holding a direct financial stake in
the outcome of the case should have an opportunity . . . to participate in the
adjudication of any issue that may ultimately shape the disposition of his or
her interest." 93 This Note contends that under the appropriate
circumstances, third parties, such as Staples in this case, can and should be
considered a "party in interest." It is submitted that Staples had a
significant "financial interest" in opposing Montgomery Ward's
assignment of its lease being that Office Depot is a competitor of Staples.
The reason given for why Staples did not have the right to be given
notice of the assignment to Office Depot was that Staples' lease was
executed long after the debtor's lease and that Staples' lease contained a
"carve-out." 94 Furthermore, "the debtor's lease provides that the exclusive
provision did not prohibit any tenant under a lease existing on the date of
[the Staples] Lease from using space occupied by it for its present
permitted use or other permitted use if and to the extent Landlord does not
have the right to prevent such change of use."95 The district court agreed
with the bankruptcy court that if Staples were entitled to notice, then that
would open a "Pandora's box," effectively allowing notice to be demanded
by all co-tenants tenants in all other shopping centers where Montgomery
Ward was a tenant and had assigned its lease. 96 Staples, however, is not a
mere co-tenant like any other "co-tenant" as described to by the bankruptcy
court. Both the non-debtor and the assignee are office supply stores, and
accordingly the non-debtor has a strong interest in opposing the
assignment. The court's reluctance to agree with Staples that it was
91 11 U. S.C. § 11I09(b) (2009).
92 In re Three A's Holdings, LLC, 364 B.R. 550, 561 (2007).
93 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, 1 1109.01[1].
94 Staples, Inc., 307 B.R. at 786.
95 Id
96 Id.
"If I hold that Staples was entitled to notice, I think one could imply that all other co-tenants
in all other centers where Montgomery Ward was a tenant and assigned its lease to someone
else should have been noticed. That could potentially place in jeopardy hundreds of
assignments that have already been completed, that have resulted in hundreds of millions of
dollars flowing into this estate. So I don't want to open that Pandora's box."
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entitled to notice of the assignment-for the reason that doing so might
open Pandora's box, allowing any tenant to subsequently demand notice-
is a weak and unconvincing argument. Staples was denied a chance to
object to an assignment that would almost certainly be damaging to its
business. Other fellow tenants of Montgomery Ward that were not
remotely affected by the assignment would have no reason to demand
notice. Disinterested tenants with no cause of action who demand notice
could possibly subject themselves to charges of a frivolous law suit.97 If,
however, another co-tenant was affected in a similar way as Staples was in
this case, then such a suit could have real legitimacy and justification. The
interest of these third parties should therefore be recognized as relevant
concerns in a bankruptcy action.
Even assuming, arguendo, that notice and due process were not violated,
the Court incorrectly applied sections 365(b)(3)(C) and (D). The court
stated that Staples' lease contained a "carve-out" that limited Staples'
exclusive right provision, and therefore disposed of Staples' argument
under section 365(b)(3)(C).98 After all, if Staples' lease allowed a potential
competitor to join the shopping center then, in compliance with the
requirements of section 365(b)(3)(C), there would be adequate assurance
that the assignment of the debtor's the lease would not "breach any ...
provision contained in any other lease[s]." 99 Once the court reached the
conclusion that Staples' had no operative exclusivity provision, the court
made almost no analysis of a claim that the assignment disrupted tenant
mix in violation of section 365(b)(3)(D).100 The decision basically
97 FED. R. Civ. P. I1(b) and (c) provide:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper ... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law ....
(c) Sanctions.
(1) If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule
11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law
firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.
98 Staples, Inc. 307 B.R. at 786 (reasoning that since the Staples lease does not prohibit the
assignment to another tenant, therefore Staples no longer had a legal interest in the proposed use of the
retail space).
99 11 U.S.C. §365(b)(3)(C) (2009).
100 See Staples, Inc. 307 B.R. at 787 (stating merely that the bankruptcy court recognized that
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indicated that a tenant must have an exclusivity provision to be the basis of
an objection to an assignment, pursuant to section 365(b)(3)(C), in order to
raise a claim for disruption to the tenant mix, under section 365(b)(3)(D).
The court improperly made subsection (C) into a prerequisite to be able to
argue a tenant mix claim under subsection (D). This interpretation of the
Code is flawed as a matter of statutory construction,101 and the court's
omission deprived Staples of an adequate evaluation of the important issue
of disruption of the tenant mix. The Staples court erred on the issue of
examining and evaluating the rights afforded to a non-debtor in a
bankruptcy proceeding, highlighting the importance of addressing a non-
debtors' rights for issues regarding lease assignments during a debtor's
reorganization.
III. ELEVATING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A NON-DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN A
BANKRUPTCY ANALYSIS
This part argues that in certain situations, bankruptcy courts should give
adequate consideration to the effects that a debtor's decision might have on
a non-debtor tenant when assigning a contract or seeking to violate a use
restriction. Part III.A discusses the distinct characteristics of a shopping
center and the importance of protecting all entities in a shopping center.
Part III.B focuses on the legislative history that evidences an intention to
give non-debtor tenants standing to object to an assignment or rejection.
Part III.C examines other areas of bankruptcy law in which courts have
given deference to a non-debtor instead of assisting a debtor in
reorganizing. Part III.D offers suggestions about how the courts and the
Code should approach instances involving a non-debtor tenant's opposition
to a debtor-tenant's exercise of the rights afforded by section 365.
consideration of whether an assignment disrupts the tenant mix requires the court to determine the
balance of rights between the parties, and that the Bankruptcy court examined these equities concluding
that it would have overruled any objection by Staples to the proposed assignment and use, and that this
court agrees with their conclusion).
101 There is a settled rule of statutory construction that a statute should be read in a manner so that
no part is superfluous, and every word has an operative effect. See United States v. Nordic Village Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1992) (noting the complementary nature of the Code, and the several factors that
favor such a construction). In this case, the court mistakenly prohibited an argument of a disruption to
the tenant mix simply because there was no clause in the non-debtors lease that was breached as a result
of the permitted assignment. Subsections (C) and (D) are completely separate provisions and therefore
a tenant mix argument should be allowed under subsection (D), even if a non-debtor has no claim under
subsection (C). See also Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Interstate Non-Ferrous Corp., 99 F. Supp.
2d 1123, 1132 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that a court must interpret the statute to give effect to all of its
parts and that this includes giving effect to every word Congress used).
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A. Shopping centers are delicate enterprises and the Code must clearly
address the rights of the non-debtor
The unique nature of a shopping center necessitates an examination of
the non-debtor's rights in a bankruptcy proceeding. Shopping centers have
been referred to as "carefully planned enterprise[s]" in which the tenant
mix "may be as important to the lessor as the actual promised rental
payments, because certain mixes will attract higher patronage of the stores
in the center, and thus, a higher rental for the landlord from those stores
that are subject to a percentage of gross receipts rental agreement."l 02 Both
the landlord and all tenants in a center have a vested interest in the entities
located within the greater shopping center, and so competition amongst the
tenants must be carefully monitored.103 Too much competition hurts both
the current tenants entrenched in the center and potential tenants that might
want to eventually take a lease in the shopping center. 104 It would seem that
if each tenant (and his/her actions) can have serious consequences on other
tenants, then the interests of a non-debtor tenant should be given adequate
consideration when a fellow tenant is introducing a new entity into a
shopping center and possibly disrupting the equilibrium of the tenant
makeup.]s05 Given the case law and Congressional hearings that stress the
102 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 348-49 (1977).
103 See e.g., In re TSW Stores of Nanuet, Inc., 34 B.R. 299, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). "The evidence reveals that a good tenant mix in a shopping center benefits the
landlord and the tenants as well."; Joseph Ooi & Loo-Lee Sim, The Magnetism of Suburban Shopping
Centers: Do Size and Cineplex Matter?, 25 J. PROP. INv. & FIN. 2, 111 (2007), available at
http://emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet (noting that a great variety of shops in a
shopping center creates a more pleasant environment for shoppers and therefore entices them to visit
and stay longer).
104 See e.g., TSW Stores, 34 B.R. 299 at 303.
In some categories, duplication is desirable . . However, two competing stores selling
general merchandise at close-out would not bring in any additional potential customers and
would divide up the business between them. The other tenants in the shopping center would
not benefit from this situation. Moreover, the existence of two competing stores selling
general merchandise at close-out in a suburban shopping center would tend to limit the
potential tenants who might be interested in leasing space in such a shopping center
because there would be fewer categories of businesses to attract customers to the center.
Richard Brunelli, The Ten Most Common Pitfalls in Strip Shopping Center Development, REAL ESTATE
FIN. J., (2007), available at http://www.njretailrealty.com/news infoI.html. "A specialty center with a
complimentary tenant mix will pull from a wider radius than a similarly sized property with a mixture
of convenience tenants, which pull from a very short radius, and specialty shops. Centers with such a
mixed personality are usually doomed for failure, with the specialty shops falling first." Id.
105 See e.g., S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 33-35 (1983). "The interdependence among the tenants of a
shopping center means that the bankruptcy of one tenant will seriously affect the other tenants." Id.
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importance of the delicate balance of a shopping center, there is ample
reason to give appropriate consideration to all relevant citizens of the
shopping center.
B. Legislative History indicates that power to object to an assignment
should be granted to a non-debtor tenant
In examining the legislative history of section 365(b)(3), strong evidence
exists showing Congress had non-debtor tenants in mind when drafting
that portion of the Code. Presumably in the event of a post-bankruptcy
assignment, a landlord would be conscious of the potential effects of an
assignment that might violate a provision contained in another one of its
tenant's leases; however, in the event that the landlord does not exercise its
right to object to an assignment, a non-debtor tenant should not be forced
into a situation in which it is deprived of any of legal recourse. Congress
was aware of the possibility that a solvent tenant could land in that situation
and enacted legislation accordingly. In 1984, Congress amended sections
365(b)(3)(C) and (D) of the Code, deleting the word "substantially" from
the provision previously requiring that assignment of the shopping center
lease must not "breach substantially" certain restrictions. 106  Congress
effectively made it easier to demonstrate that an assignment by a debtor-
tenant was inappropriate because the party opposing the assignment only
had to show a breach of a restriction, not a "substantial" breach. A
Judiciary Committee report prior to the 1984 amendments highlights one of
the motivations behind the change in the language:
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the shopping center and its solvent
tenants may suffer serious economic harm or even business failure if
the bankrupt tenant closes its store for an extended period of time or
assigns its lease to a business which does not conform to the lease's
use clause thus disrupting the shopping center's tenant mix .... [T]he
bill strikes the proper balance between the interests of the solvent
Christina Gillotti, Harm to Commercial Landlord's Reputation is Sufficient for Preliminary Injunction
Issuance: Superior Court Finds Abuse of Discretion where Trial Court Ignores Imminent Harm to
Reputation, 3 LAW. J. 1, 13 (2001). "Moreover, he testified that the economic interdependence between
the stores is a key part of the center's success." Id.
106 See In re Trak Auto Corp. v. West Town Center, LLC, 367 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2004)
(stating that Congress responded in 1984 by amending the shopping center provisions to delete the word
"substantially."); see also Ominsky, supra note 41, at 13 (commenting that the 1984 Congressional
Amendments were made because the previous formulation of the Code made it too easy for the debtor
to make lease assignments and avoid lease restrictions, resulting in problems with tenant mix and
adversely affecting shopping centers).
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tenants of a shopping center and the insolvent tenants.10 7
The significance Congress has given to maintaining the balanced tenant
mix strongly indicates that if a non-debtor has reason to object to an
assignment that might threaten the carefully planned tenant mix, then that
tenant should be given its day in court.
C. Heightened standards of review in other cases lend support to a more
generalized view of the effect of assignment or rejection of an
agreement or provision
In at least two other areas of bankruptcy law, courts have recognized the
unique nature of certain contracts necessitates an examination beyond the
two parties to a contract. As discussed in Part I of this Note, 08 in Mirant,
the Fifth Circuit instructed the district court to apply a stricter standard than
the "business judgment" test when the contract at issue affected the public
interest. Similarly in the Supreme Court case of Bildisco, the Court
reasoned that rejecting collective bargaining agreements required a
balancing of all equities.109 Shopping center leases are also extremely
unique and have wide ranging consequences on multiple parties.
Accordingly, all factors, including issues raised by non-debtor tenants,
should be evaluated. Furthermore, the inherent nature of a bankruptcy
court strongly suggests that the interests of a non-debtor tenant could be
potentially relevant in a court's decision to reject or allow an assignment.
Bankruptcy courts are courts of equity, so by definition their purpose is to
balance issues of fairness in a bankruptcy proceeding.110 Traditionally, the
courts attempt to assist the bankrupt entity and provide the possibility of
reorganization,III but it seems reasonable that in balancing fairness, non-
debtors' interests should be considered as well.
107 S. REP No. 98-65, at 33-35 (1983) (emphasis added).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 18-25. It should be noted that subsequent cases to Bildisco
have commented that the Bildisco ruling is not limited to CBAs, leaving the door open to the possibility
that shopping center leases can be subject to the same type of analysis and treatment regarding third
party interest. See, e.g., In re FBI Distribution Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2003), where the court
noted that Bildisco "did not limit its discussion to collective bargaining agreements, but instead
discussed general principles of executory contract law." Id.
110 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984). "Bankruptcy Court is a court of
equity, and in making [the] determination [of what would constitute a successful rehabilitation of the
debtors in the case] it is in a very real sense balancing the equities . . . ." Id.; see also Bank of Marin v.
England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966). "There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles
govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id.
Ill In re Jamesway Corp., 201 B.R. 73, 79 (S.D.N.Y 1996). The "fundamental bankruptcy policy
[is] allowing a debtor to realize maximum value from its assigned leases for the benefit of its estate and
creditors." Id.
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In contrast to the bankruptcy bourt in Staples, the court in In re Petur
USA Instruments Co.112 recognized the damaging effect that rejection of a
contract would have on a non-debtor party and made its ruling accordingly.
The debtor, which marketed geotechnical instruments invented by one of
its principals, sought to reject a twenty year licensing agreement with a
closely held company formed solely for the purpose of marketing the
debtor's products in Canada.11 3 The court, in reviewing the debtor's
decision to reject its contract with the Canadian company concluded that
the debtor had "properly exercised its business judgment and that rejection
could well create additional profits and aid in reorganization."" l4
Nevertheless, the court declined to authorize the debtor's rejection of the
licensing agreement because it found that granting the motion would result
in the complete destruction of the non-debtor licensee's business and that
damage to the licensee would be grossly disproportionate to any benefit
derived by general creditors."l 5 Despite the fact that the debtor would have
benefited from rejecting the agreement, the court recognized how
devastating that would be to the non-debtor and prohibited the rejection.
The use of the broader-interest approach followed by courts regarding
collective bargaining agreements and licensing agreements, should be made
explicitly available and encouraged for issues pertaining to non-debtor
tenants in a shopping center.
D. Finding a Solution
This note suggests that it is incumbent upon the Bankruptcy Code to
specifically address the standing of non-debtor tenants in bankruptcy
proceedings. The Code should find a balance between its goal of assisting
a bankrupt entity in recovery on the one hand, and protecting solvent
tenants from the actions of a tenant that is attempting to reorganize after
filing for bankruptcy on the other. Non-debtors should be allowed to object
to an assignment of a lease if it unduly burdens their own interest. If a
bankruptcy court finds that a non-debtors interest would be unduly
burdened by an assignment, then the non-debtor's interest should be
factored into a court's decision of whether to allow the assignment of a
debtor's lease. Similarly, the balancing test employed by the Trak Auto
112 35 B.R. 561, 563 (W. D. Wash. 1983).
113 See id. at 562.
114 Id. at 563.
115 See id
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court for evaluating whether to enforce a use restriction' 16 should tilt
toward the side of enforcement of the restriction if a non-debtor's interest
would be unduly burdened if a debtor was permitted to violate it. There
should be a rebuttable presumption that if the landlord has not objected to a
debtor-tenant's lease then the assignment does not unduly burden the non-
debtor's lease, and the non-debtor is not entitled to standing to object to the
assignment. This presumption in favor of the debtor recognizes the
importance of assisting the debtor in reorganization, improving the chances
that a bankruptcy court will approve an assignment if such assignment
would be a useful means of reorganizing for the debtor. To overcome the
presumption, the non-debtor must show that given the assignment, the
presence of the newly assigned tenant would have had a substantial
influence on the decision of whether to initially enter into the lease. This
concept of a subjective standard by which to measure whether a particular
problem in a situation affects the value or desirability of a piece of property
is already recognized in Property law. In deciding whether a tenant may
terminate its lease due to non-disclosure of a defect with the property, the
level of the materiality of the defect is measured by whether the defect
affects the subjective desirability of the property.1 7 This same idea should
be incorporated into the Code to measure the thrust and legitimacy of a
non-debtor's objection to an assignment or rejection of a lease.
CONCLUSION
The distinctive nature of a shopping center and the selectivity of the
tenants chosen by the landlord create a delicate balance among shopping
center co-tenants. A disruption of the tenant mix can drastically change
tenants' expectations of its bargained-for lease arrangement. When a
company files for bankruptcy, the Code is understandably concerned with
116 See supra text accompanying notes 62-73 (explaining the balancing used by the court relating
to the lease's restrictive use clause; balancing the reasonableness of the debtor's assignment against the
harm or effect it would have on the landlord); Lisa S. Gretchko, Last in Line: Debtor Beware! BAPCPA
Affects Nonresidential Real Estate Leases, Too, 25-8 AM. BANKR. L.J. 16, 55 (2006) (noting that
Congress' codification of Track Auto is "very good news for shopping center lessors and the other
tenants in the shopping center who wish to enforce the restrictive use provisions in their shopping
center leases.").
117 "It should be pointed out that whether the matter not disclosed by the seller or his agent is of
sufficient materiality to affect the value or desirability of the property, and thus make operative the rule
announced by the foregoing authorities, depends on the facts of the particular case." Lingsch v. Savage,
213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 737 (1963); see Alfaro v. Cmty Hous. Improvement Sys. & Planning Ass'n.,
Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1382 (2009). This case cites Lingsch for the proposition that "a seller of
real property has a common law duty to disclose 'where the seller knows of facts materially affecting
the value or desirability of the property . . . .'
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helping the debtor reorganize to help it become a functioning business once
again. Sometimes, however, that objective may be difficult to accomplish
without crippling other businesses. In a carefully planned enterprise such
as a shopping center, bankruptcy courts should be cautious of the effects a
debtor's lease assignment might have on not only the landlord, but also
fellow tenants. A non-debtor should have standing to object to a debtor's
actions that have significant, adverse effects on the non-debtor's interests.
The current economic downturn this country is facing has caused a sharp
increase in bankruptcy filing and store closures.118 As businesses try to
navigate through the economic challenges that lie ahead, bankruptcy relief
should remain a haven for struggling entities, but must be carefully
administered to minimize resulting damage to their vulnerable non-debtor
peers.
118 See Chelsea Emery, US. Strip Malls Suffer as Retail Tenants Disappear, REUTERS, Nov. 25,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE4APO7320081126 (stating that retail
vacancy rates and bankruptcy filings have increased, and that the International Council for Shopping
Centers estimates about 148,000 retail store closings this year); see also Michael Barbaro, Retailing
Chains Caught in a Wave of Bankruptcies, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/business/15retail.html (discussing how the credit crisis has caused
many retail stores to close and file for bankruptcy, altering the tenant composition of shopping malls).
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